Fourth Review Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/WP.4
3 September 1990

Original: ENGLISH

Geneva
20 August-14 September 1990

SUGGESTED PARAGRAPHS FOR INCLUSION IN THE FINAL DECLARATION ON ARTICLE VI AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 8 TO 12

Developments since 1985 and conclusions and objectives prior to 1995

Working Paper submitted by Ghana, Kenya, Mexico, Philippines and Venezuela

I. Cessation of the nuclear arms race

A. Past developments

1. The Conference noted with regret that, during the period under review:

-- the Third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament was not even able to reaffirm the Final Document of the First Special Session;

-- the destructive potentials of the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States Parties were undergoing continuing development, including continued testing and development of new delivery systems;

-- although bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America had been held since 1985 to consider questions concerning space and nuclear arms, no agreements relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race had emerged so far;

-- the trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty, called for by the 1985 Review Conference, had not resumed in 1985 or thereafter;

-- the Conference on Disarmament had been called upon by the General Assembly in ten successive years to begin negotiations on such a Treaty, but that such negotiations had not been initiated; and

-- the last five years had not given any results concerning negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race;

2. The Conference deplored that, in the last five years, despite the ending of the Cold War:

-- a new environment, space, was increasingly being drawn into the arms race;

-- no progress has been made on relevant items of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular those relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race;

-- the appeals contained in United Nations General Assembly resolutions since 1981 for a moratorium on nuclear weapon testing pending conclusion of a comprehensive test ban Treaty have gone completely unanswered by two of the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty; and

-- the appeals in ten United Nations General Assembly resolutions since 1982 for a freeze on all nuclear weapons in quantitative and qualitative terms have also gone unanswered.

3. The Conference took note of:

-- the Meeting of the Parties to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty held in New York from 23 May to 8 June 1990 for the organization of a Conference of the Parties to that Treaty to be held in New York in January 1991 to consider an amendment to convert that Treaty into a comprehensive test ban treaty;

-- the Nuclear Testing Talks between the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and the United States of America; and

-- the establishment, without a negotiating mandate, of an ad hoc committee on Nuclear Test Ban by the Conference on Disarmament at its summer 1990 session.

4. The Conference noted that, in its declaration on international security and disarmament, the Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Belgrade from 4 to 7 September 1989, "underlined that the immediate suspension and comprehensive ban on nuclear tests remained one of the highest priorities of nuclear disarmament" and "called on the three depositary states of NPT to be forthcoming on nuclear disarmament matters. For the credibility of the NPT regime, these States should fulfill their obligations by agreeing to negotiate a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty which is absolutely essential for the preservation of the Non-Proliferation regime embodied in the NPT. Nuclear-weapon states have a responsibility to assure all non-nuclear weapon states, whether parties or non-parties of NPT, against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by concluding an Agreement to this effect. They, however, remained convinced that the most effective measure to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is complete cessation of nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament."

B. Future

1. The Conference concluded that, since no agreements had been achieved in the period under review on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, the aspirations contained in preambular paragraphs 8 to 12 had still not been met, and the objectives under Article VI had not yet been achieved.

2. The Conference, mindful that only five years remain of the initial term in force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, reaffirmed that:

-- a comprehensive test ban treaty would make the single most important contribution toward strengthening and extending the international barriers against the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

-- adherence to such a treaty by all States would contribute substantially to the full achievement of the non-proliferation objective; and

-- the implementation of Article VI is essential to the maintenance and strengthening of the Treaty.

3. The Conference declared that:

-- achievement of a multilateral comprehensive test ban treaty prior to 1995 must continue to be accorded absolute priority, as the single most important measure relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, and

-- the continued testing of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty would put the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty beyond 1995 in grave doubt.

4. The Conference urges:

-- all Parties to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, beginning at the January 1991 Conference, to pursue negotiations in good faith to convert that Treaty into a comprehensive test ban treaty, and to continue their efforts through as many sessions as necessary to conclude successfully their work;

-- the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to proceed directly and immediately to negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty in their Nuclear Testing Talks;

-- the Conference on Disarmament, at the beginning of its first 1991 session, to give the ad hoc committee on Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to proceed directly to comprehensive test ban treaty negotiations;

-- all States to work for a rational and efficient relationship between the several test-ban negotiating fora with a view to concluding a comprehensive test ban treaty with the widest possible adherence at the earliest possible date prior to 1995.

5. The Conference maintained that the unwillingness of a Party to the Treaty to engage in multilateral comprehensive test ban treaty negotiations shall be deemed an act contrary to the spirit and letter of the Treaty since it represents non-compliance with the obligations under the Treaty.

6. The Conference called upon the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on:

-- the cessation of the production of weapons-grade fissionable material;

-- the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons;

-- the cessation of the production of their delivery vehicles; and

-- the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

II. Nuclear disarmament

A. Past developments

1. The Conference noted that the efforts of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to ensure effective measures for nuclear disarmament had recently yielded some results.

2. The Conference noted with regret:

-- that the INF Treaty resulted primarily in the elimination of intermediate-range ground-based cruise missiles and ballistic missiles deployed some years earlier, that the nuclear warheads of the these systems are not being destroyed, and that deployments of intermediate-range forces are going forward in other basing modes; and

-- that the aim of the START talks, if realized, will leave more strategic nuclear warheads in the arsenals of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America than when the negotiations began in 1982; and

-- that the number of strategic warheads in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty have increased three-fold since the entry into force of the Treaty.

3. The Conference noted with regret that, during the period under review:

-- the Third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament was not able to reach agreement even on reaffirming the Final Document of the First Special Session;

-- no progress on items of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament relating to nuclear disarmament has been made; and

-- the appeals in ten United Nations General Assembly resolutions since 1982 for a freeze on all nuclear weapons in quantitative and qualitative terms have also gone unanswered.

4. The Conference expressed its regret that the bilateral negotiations had not complemented nor ensured the positive outcome of multilateral negotiations on disarmament, and reaffirmed the view that ultimately the bilateral negotiations, just as in efforts in general to limit and reduce arms, should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.

5. The Conference noted that, despite the ending of the Cold War, the destructive potentials of the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States Parties were undergoing continuing development, including the development and deployment of new delivery systems.

B. Future

1. The Conference concluded that:

-- the undertaking of Parties to the Treaty to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmameant has not been fulfilled; and

-- that recently agreed measures when implemented, and projected measures if realised, are inadequate, since they will leave deployed in 1995 not less but many more nuclear weapons than were deployed in 1970.

2. The Conference, mindful that only five years remain of the initial term in force of the Treaty, reaffirmed that:

-- a freeze on the deployment of nuclear weapons while negotiations on reductions are underway is the only way of ensuring that deep cuts can be achieved;

-- a time-table for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery is the only way to ensure the complete elimination of nuclear weapons at an early date; and

-- an arms race in space would impede, stall, or reverse efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals and must therefore be prevented.

3. The Conference declared:

-- that a freeze on the deployment of nuclear weapons must be accorded high priority;

-- that the continued deployment of new nuclear weapons systems by nuclear weapon States Parties to this Treaty would put the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty beyond 1995 in grave doubt.

III. General and complete disarmament

A. Past developments

1. The Conference noted the lack of progress in the Conference on Disarmament on the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

2. The Conference noted the failure of the Third Special Session on Disarmamaent to reaffirm the Final Declaration of the First Special Session.

B. Future

The Conference concluded that, since no agreements had been achieved in the period under view on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, the aspiration contained in preambular paragraph 11 had still not been met, and the objective under Article VI had not yet been achieved.